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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**

EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION OF
THE POSTPETITION FINANCER
AND THE USE OF SHAREHOLDER
GUARANTEES TO ESCAPE THE
ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE:
LESSONS FROM THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT

The cramdown provisions of
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
are designed to enable the debtor to
achieve confirmation of a reorganization plan notwithstanding its inability to obtain the necessary acceptances of all classes of impaired
creditors and interest holders. However, cramdown may not be accomplished unless the plan is ''fair and
equitable'' to the nonaccepting
classes, which means that the plan
must follow the ''absolute priority
rule'' set forth in Code Section
1129(b). If a class of creditors is to
receive less than full payment and
does not accept the plan, a cramdown is not possible if the plan
permits shareholders to receive or
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retain anything on account of their
equity interests. 1
Imagine a debtor who attempts a
cramdown confirmation with a plan
that seeks to subordinate its postpetition priority financer, and which
offers creditors (including the postpetition financer) less than full payment while permitting the shareholders to keep their shares. The
only justification offered for permitting shareholders to keep their
shares is that shareholders' guarantees constitute a new capital investment in the debtor corporation.
Should such a plan be confirmed?
Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2
A case of this nature was K.ham
& Nate's Shoes No. 2,2 involving a
debtor (the Debtor) that operated
retail shoe stores in Chicago. The
Debtor had been in chapter 11 since
1984 and had submitted a plan of
reorganization that had been confirmed by the bankruptcy court. The
district court affirmed the confirmation 9rder. First Bank of Whiting
(the Bank), one of its creditors, appealed to the court of appeals on
the grounds that the order not only
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).
Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v.
First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th
Cir. 1990) (Reh'g and Reh'g en bane denied).
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reduced the Bank's priority claim to
general unsecured status, but also
allowed the debtor's two shareholders (the Sharellolders) to retain their
equity interests despite the plan's
failure to pay creditors in full.
The financing of the Debtor by
the Bank commenced in July 1981,
at which time Kham & Nate's
owned four retail shoe stores. A
loan of $50,000 was reduced to
$42,000 by 1983, at which time the
Bank issued several letters of credit
in favor of the Debtor's customers.
The Debtor issued a note to the Bank
to support the letters of credit and
gave the Bank a security interest
only in the goods furnished by the
suppliers.
In late 1983, the Debtor experienced cash-flow problems and
asked the Bank for additional financing, which the Bank agreed to
provide on condition that the loan
could be made secure. However, it
was difficult to satisfy the Bank that
new financing would be secure in
view of the Debtor's tax liability of
$440,000, a hurdle that could not be
overcome as the parties considered
that "any new loan from Bank
would stand behind the back tax
liabilities.' ' 3
The parties considered two ways
of securing the Bank: a guarantee by
the Small Business Administration
(SBA) or the filing of a bankruptcy
petition after which an order could
be procured giving the Bank a postpetition loan superpriority. The second alternative was used.

The Debtor filed its petition under
chapter 11 in January 1984 and the
bankruptcy court granted its application for an order under Section
364(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code,
giving the Bank's postpetition financing priority over administrative
expenses incurred in the case. 4 The
Debtor and the Bank lhen signed
their loan agreement, which opened
a $300,000 line of credit. The contract also provided for- cancellation
on five days' notice, "and adds for
good measure that 'nothing provided herein shall constitute a ~aiver
of the right of the Bank to terminate
financing at any time.' '' 5
The contract was signed on January 23, 1984, and the Debtor immediately took $75,000. Suppliers also
began drawing on the letters of credit issued by the Bank. On February
29, the Bank mailed the Debtor a
letter stating that it would make no
additional advances after March 7,
1984. Although the note underlying
the line of credit was payable upon
demand, the Bank did not make the
demand, and continued honoring
draws on the letters of credit. The
Debtor's ultimate indebtedness to
the Bank was approximately
$164,000: $42,000 on the prepetition loan made in 1981, $47,000 on
the letters of credit, and $75,000 on
the postpetition line of credit. The
Debtor paid $10,000 against the line
of credit in April 1985. The court
observed that the Debtor did not ask
the court ''to order Bank to make
4

3

5

908 F.2d at 1353.
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908 F.2d at 1353.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE LAW JOURNAL

further advances or to grant superpriority to another creditor to facilitate loans from another source.' ' 6
In the spring of 1988, four years
after filing its petition, the Debtor
proposed its fourth plan of reorganization. Although the previous three
plans had called for the Bank to be
paid in full, the fourth plan proposed
to treat the Bank's claims as general,
unsecured claims to receive less
than full payment, while allowing
the Shareholders to keep their stock
in exchange for guaranteeing new
loans to the Debtor.
[The Bankruptcy Judge] held an evidentiary hearing on the fourth plan
and concluded that Bank had behaved
inequitably in terminating the line of
credit and inducing Debtor's suppliers to draw on the letters of credit.
These draws, the judge concluded,
converted Bank from art unsecured
lender (the position it held before
the bankruptcy) to a super-secured
lender under [the bankruptcy
judge's] financing mder. 7

The.bankruptcy judge vacated the
financing order and equitably subordinated the Bank's debt pursuant
to Section 510(c) of the Code. 8 The
plan of reorganization, including
the provision allowing the Stockholders ~o retain their interest, was

[VOL. 24:400 1992]

confirmed. The guarantees were
found to be "new value" equivalent
to the worth of the interest that the
Stockholders would retain. The
Bank appealed to the district court,
which affirmed. 9
The question of appellate jurisdiction was raised by the Bank even
though it had filed the appeal. After
an extensive discussion on appellate
jurisdiction, the court of appeals
held that a "confirmation order is
always appealable" as a final
order. 10
Equitable Subordination
Turning to the issue of subordination of the Bank's claim, the court
stated that such equitable subordination required two steps: (1) setting
aside the bankruptcy judge's financing order and (2) the application of
Section 51 0(c). The court commented, however, that there was an "intermediate step,'' suggested by Section 364(e), which provides that the
reversal or modification of a financing order on appeal ' 'does not affect
the validity of any debt so incurred,
or any priority or lien so granted,
to an entity that extended such credit
in good faith. " 11
Clarifying the operation of Section 364(e), the court stated:

6

908 F.2d at 1354.
7 /d.
8
See .11 U .S.C. § 510(c): "Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, after notice and a hearing, the court
may (1) under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all
or part of another allowed claim .... ''
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In other words, a lender that extends
credit in reliance on a financing order
is entitled to the benefit of that order,
even if it turns out to be legally
or factually erroneous. Although
9

See 104Bankr. 909(N.D. Ill. 1989).
908 F.2d at 1355.
11
11 U.S.C. § 364(e).
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§ 364(e) speaks only of modification
- on appeal, it instantiates the principle
that bankruptcy judges may make
binding commitments to give priority
to new credit. If creditors fear that
the rug will be pulled out from under
them, they will hesitate to lend. So
§ 364(e) and companion provisions,
e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) ... disable
courts from backtracking on promises in the absence'of bad faith, which
is a very narrow exception. 12

The court clearly indicated that
the bankruptcy judge's financing order under Section 364(e) was a binding commitment to the lender and
that modification of the order
poses the same risks as does reversal
on appeal. Accordingly, although
364(e) does not apply by its own
terms, its principle applies through
the law of the case. A judge lacks the
power to undo the priority granted
by a financing order without first
fmding that the creditor acted in bad
faith. 13

The lack of this fmding by the
bankruptcy judge, however, appeared to be caused by the Bank's
own failure to make the Section
364(e) argument. "Even in this
court, Bank ignores the principle
behind § 364(e) and is content to
argue that Debtor did not meet the
criteria for subordination under
51 0(c). " 14 However, since the
Bank's appeal ignored the application of Section 364(e), the court

of appeals addressed the issue of
subordination of the Bank's claim.
"We take commercial cases as the
parties frame them, so we shall
press on to the application of
§ 510(c) without implying that this
is the proper way to proceed in
future cases. " 15
The bankruptcy court gave two
reasons for subordinating the
Bank's claim. One was that notwithstanding the Bank's awareness of
the Debtor's plight and its r~liance
upon the letter of credit, the Bank
disregarded the consequences to the
Debtor and its creditors ofterminatin~ its financing. The other reason
was that the Bank obtained an unfair
advantage by inducing suppliers to
draw on the letters of credit after
the financing order, "thus promoting its position on these advances
from unsecured to supersecured. '' 16
The Bank made the analysis of the
second reason easy by disclaiming
priority status for the $47,000 advanced postpetition to satisfy the
letters of credit that were issued
prepetition, and for the $42,000 balance outstanding on the prepetition
loan made in 1981.

12
908 F .2d at 1355, citing In re Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pac. RR, 799 F .2d
317,329-330(7thCir. 1986).
13
908 F.2d at 1355:
l4Jd.
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These are, and always have been,
unsecured loans. Orders under
§ 364(c) do not allow a creditor to
boost the priority of existing loans
[citations omitted]. Section 364(c)
speaks of ''obtaining of credit or the
incurring of debt'' (emphasis added);
prior loans and sums disbursed on
prior firm commitments fit neither
15

16

Id. at 1356.

ld.
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category. Sums paid out after bankruptcy on letters of credit issued before bankruptcy are pre-ba~ptcy
loans, to which § 364(c) cannot
apply, because the bank is committed
before the bankruptcy to honor sight
drafts tendered with conforming
draws. Priority under § 364 is not
necessary to obtain this credit for
the debtor. So although the financing
order appears to give Bank priority
on all of its loans, pre- and postftling, "Bank wisely concedes that
the order could not properly have
done so. The 1981 loan and the advances in 1984 to honor the letters of
credit always were unsecured. The
pllll! of reorganization properly treats
them as unsecured. 17

Therefore, subordination was
relevant only with regard to the
$65,000 balance due under the line
of credit authorized by the financing
order. The court of appeals noted
that section 510(c) authorized bankruptcy judges to subordinate clain}s
but did not provide criteria for the
exercise of the power.
Absence of statutory criteria commits the subject to the courts, to be
worked out in the common law fashion [citations omitted]. Equitable
subordination usually is a response
to efforts by corporate insiders to
convert their equity interests into secured debt in anticipation of bankruptcy [citations omitted]. Courts require the insiders to return to their
position at the end of the line. Virtual
Network extends principles of equitable subordination to a penalty created
by operation of law, where delay in
17

ld.
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collecting the penalty injured other
creditors. But Bank, however, was
neither an insider nor a person seeking to collect a penalty, and it has
not delayed without justification. It
contributed new value under a contract, and it wants no more than the
priority [the bankruptcy judge]
promised as the lure. 18

Observing that cases subordinating the claims of creditors that dealt
at ann's length with the debtor were
few, the court noted that under existing case law subordination depends upon a combination of inequitable conduct, unfair advantage to
the creditor, and injury to other
creditors. 19 The Debtor argued that
conduct may be unfair and inequitable for this purpose even though
the creditor complies with all the
contractual requirements. The court
of appeals disagreed. '' [W]e are not
'Willing to embrace a rule that requires participants in commercial
transactions not only to keep their
contracts but also do 'more'-just
how much more resting in the discretion of a bankruptcy judge assessing the situation years later. '' 20
(

·"Inequitable conduct" in commercial life means breach plus some advantage-taking, such as the star who
agrees to act in a motion picture and
then, after $20 million has been
spent, sulks in his dressing room until
the contract has been renegotiated
18 Jd. The court referred to In re Virtual
Network Servs. Corp., 902 F.2d 1246 (7th
Cir. 1990).
19
The court cited Benjamin v. Diamond,
563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977).
20
908 F .2d at 1356.
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[citations omitted]. Finns that have
negotiated contracts are entitled to
enforce them to the letter, even to
the great discomfort of their trading
partners, without being mulcted for
lack of "good faith." Although
courts often refer to the obligation
of good faith that exists in every
contractual relation, e.g., UCC § 1201 [citation omitted], this is not an
invitation to the court to decide
whether one party ought to have exercised privileges expressly reserved
in the document. '·'Good faith" is
a compact reference to an implied
undertaking not to take opportunistic'
advanf;age in a way that could not
have been contemplated at the time
of drafting and which therefore was
not resolved explicitly by the parties.
When the contract is silent, principles of good ·faith-such as the
UCC's stailtlard of honesty in fact,
UCC § 1-201(19), and the reasonable expectations of the trade, UCC
§ 2-103(b) (a principle applicable,
however, only to "merchants,"
which Bank is not)-flll the gap.
They do not block use of terms that
actually appear in the contract. 21

The Bank did not break a promise
at the time that the Debtor was vulnerable because of financial difficulties and then use the costs and
delay of obtaining legal enforcement of the contract as "levers to a
better deal. " 22 The contract expressly allowed the Bank to cease
making further advances; it made a
clean break after loaning the Debtor
$75,000 and did not demand improved terms. "It had the right to
21

22

908 F.2dat 1356-1357.
908 F .2d at 1257.

do this for any reason satisfactory
to itself. " 23
The Debtor asserted that the
Bank's conduct left it with great
difficulty in its search for funds.
The court commented that the Bank"
did not create the Debtor's need for
funds and it was not contractually
obliged to satisfy its customer's desires. The court disagreed with the
decision in KMC, Inc,. v. Irving
Trust Co. 24 to the extent that it held
that a bank must loan more money
or give more advance notice of termination than its contrac~ requires.
"First Bank of Whiting is not an
eleemosynary institution. It need
not throw good money after bad,.
even if other persons would catch
the lucre.' ' 25
The court also discarded the
Debtor's argument, and the bankruptcy judge's finding, that the
Bank would have been secure in
making additional advances. The
contract did not obligate the Bank
to make all advances for which it
could be assured of payment. Moreover, the court of appeals addressed
the bankruptcy court's :finding tha.t
the Bank acted inequitably in agreeing to extend additional credit only
ifKham & Nate's first filed a bankruptcy petition or obtained a guarantee from the SBA. This condition,
the Debtor argued, forced the firm
into bankruptcy, and having pro23
/d., citing In re Prima Co., 98 F .2d
952, 965 (7th Cir. 1938); CTS Truss, Inc.,
868 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1989).
24
757 F.2d 752, 759-763 (6th Cir.
1986).
:zs 908 F.2d at 1358.
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pelled it there, the Bank was then
obliged to help.
This is insufficient on two levelsfirst because filing for bankruptcy
often helps rather than injures the
firm (the automatic stay keeps the
wolves and tax collectors from the
door), and second because linking an
offer of extra credit to a bankruptcy
petition d~s not 'force' a firm to file
one. A bank may insist on security
before lending; bankruptcy followed
by an order under § 364 was one
device for providing it. 26

The court also rejected the argument that subordination was justified because the Bank's termination
of advances frustrated the Oebtor's
efforts to secure advances from other sources and propelled it downhill. These allegations, if true, are
legally irrelevant. As to the Bank's
oreach of the agreement by failing
to give telephonic notice of termination, which the court characterized
as trivial, the court of appeals concluded that "[e]quitable subordination under § 51 0(c) is not a device
to magnify the damages available
for inconsequential breaches of contract. " 27
Shareholder Guarantees are not
New Value
Having concluded that the Bank's
claim could not be the subject of
equitable subordination under Section 51 0(c) of the Bankruptcy Code,

[VOL. 24 : 400 1992]

the court then faced the issue of
whether the Debtor's plan of reorganization was properly confirmed
under Section 1129(b). The court
noted that Section 1129(a) provides
for confirmation upon the approval
of each impaired class, but that Section 1129(b)(l)providesthata "fair
and equitable" plan may be
''crammed down the throats of objecting creditors. " 28 The Bankruptcy Code provides that a plan treats
a class of unsecured creditors who
are not receiving full payment of
their claims fairly and equitably if
the holder of any claim or interest
that is junior to the claims of such
class will not receive or retain under
the plan en account of such junior
.claim or interest any property.
"Tliis is the 'absolute priority rule.'
An objection to the plan may be
overridden only if every class lower
in priority is wiped out. " 29
The bankruptcy court, hovtever,
approved a cramdown plan although
unsecured creditors, including the
Bank, would not be paid in full,
while shareholders retained equity
interests. The Bank's objection to
the plan was overruled by the bankruptcy court after finding that the
plan would be fair and equitable.
The bankruptcy court ''allowed the
stockholders to retain their interests, reasoning that by guaranteeing
a $435,000 loan.to be made as part
of the plans, [the stockholders] contributed 'new value' justifying the

26

/d.

28

27

/d.

29
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retention of their stock. The size of
the new debt made the risk of the
guarantees 'substantial,' the court
found. '' 30
The bankruptcy court allowed the
stockholders to keep their stock because the risk of the guarantees also
exceeded the value of the retained
stock. Considering the history of
the Debtor and the various risks
associated witll the Debtor's business, the stock would have only
minimal value. ''[The stockholders]
thus would contribute more than
they would receive, so the court
allowed them to keep their stock.' ' 31
The court of appeals was puzzled
by this anomaly:
There is something unreal about this
calculation. If the stock is worth less
than the guarantees, .why are [the
stockholders] doing it? If the value
of the stock is 'minimal,' why. does
Bank object to letting [the stockholders] keep it? Is everyone acting inconsistently with self-interest, as the
court's findings imply? And why, if
the business·is likely to fail, making
the value of the stock 'minimal,'
could the court confirm the plan of
reorganization? Confirmation depends on a conclusion that the reorganized finn is likely to succeed, and
not relapse into 'liquidation, or the
need for further financial reorganization.' 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(ll). If,
as the bankruptcy court found, the
plan complies with this requirement,
then the equity interest in the finn
must by worth something-as [the
30
31

stockholders] and Bank all appear to
believe. 32

The court of appeals, citing the
Ahlers case, 33 noted that stock is
property for the purposes of Section
1129(b)(2){B)(ii) even if the firm
has a negative net worth. The court
indicated that the stockholoers received an option to purchase stock,
which they could exercise if they
thought that the shares were worth
more than the ri~k created by the
guarantees. "Whether we characterize the stock or the option to
buy it as the 'property,' the transaction seems to run afoul of
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) for it means that
although a class of unsecured creditors is not paid in full, a junior
class (the stockholders) keeps some
'property.' '' 34
"Only the 'new.value exception'
to the absolute priority. rule could
support this outcome. 3s Court opiniorrprior to enactment of the Bankruptcy Code contained dicta saying
that investors who supplied new
capital may retain interests equal
to or lower in value than the new
contribution. '<'These interests are
not so much 'retained' as purchased
for the new value (the 'option' characterization of the transaction).
Some firms depend for success on
the entrepreneurial skills or special
knowledge of managers who are
also shareholders. " 36 If these man32Jd.
33

Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers,
485 u.s. 197 (1988).
34
908 F .2d at 1360.

/d.
/d.

3' /d.
36 /d.
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agers are not retained, they may
leave the firm and reduce its value.
If they may contribute new value
and retain an interest, this may tie
them to the firm and so improve its
prospects. " 37
The court of appeals recognized
that the e~c}ijlnge of stock for new
value IJUlY make sense~ but pointed
out that "[W]hen there is value to
be gained by allowing a lower class
to kick in new value and keep its
interest, the creditors should be
willing to go along. " 38 The court
of appeals defmed a "new value
exception" to the absolute priority
rule as a power in the judge to sell
stock to the managers even when the
creditors believe that the transaction
will not increase the value of the
firm. ''To understand whether the
Code gives the judge this power, ...
it is necessary to examine the genesis of the doctrine.' ' 39
The court analyzed several of the
cases under the former 'Bankruptcy
Act. In Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Products Co. ,40 the bankruptcy
judge allowed shareholders-to retain
an interest in exchange for their
proniis~ to CO!J.tribute value in the
form of continuity of management
and their influence in the community that 'Would enable the debtor to
raise new money. The plan allowed
shareholders to retain their interests
even th~mgh a class of senior creditors objected. The Supreme Court
38

ld.
ld.

39

/d.

40

30~

37
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reversed, however, holding that
new value must mean "money or
money's worth. " 41
The Bank argued that the new
value exception vanished in 1978,
but the court of appeals refused to
go that far. "We stop short of the
precipice, as the Supreme Court did
in Ahlers . .. for two reasons: First,
the consideration for the shares is
insufficient even if the new value
exception retains vitality; second,
although Bank vigorously argues
the merits of the new value exception in this court, it did not make this
argument in the bankruptcy court.''
Notwithstanding the Bank's failure
to preserve its argument, the history
and limits of the rule before 1978
were pertinent in that Ahlers held
that "at a minimum the Code forBids any expansion of the exception
beyond the limits recognized in
Case. " 42
Ahlers reinforced the message of
Case, holding that "a promise of
future labor coupled with the managers' experience and expertise,
also is not new value. " 43 The court
then held that the guarantees were
IJO different: ''They are intangible,
inalienable, .and unenforceable by
the firm. [The shareholders] may
revoke their guarantees, or render
them valueless by disposing of their
assets . . . . Guarantees have 'no
place in the asset column' of a balance sheet ... [T]he reeord does not
reveal whether [the shareholders]
41
42

I

u.s. 106 (1939).

43
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have substantial unencumbered
assets that the guarantees would put
at risk. '' 44
.. /d.

The court of appeals concluded
that the plan of reorganization
should not have been confirmed
over the Bank's objection, vacated
the order, and remanded th.e case .
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